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James G. Taylor 
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ABSTRACT 
The optimization of the dynamics of combat (optimal distribution of fire over enemy 
target types) is studied through a sequence of idealized models by use of the mathematical 
theory of optimal controL The models are for combat over a period of time described by 
Lanchester-type equations with a choice of tactics available to one side and subject to change 
with time. The structure of optimal fire distribution policies is discussed with reference to 
the influence of combatant objectives, termination conditions of the conflict, type of attri- 
tion process, and variable attrition-rate coefficients. Implications for intelligence, command 
and control systems, and human decision making are pointed out. The use of such optimal 
control models for guiding extensions to differential games is discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper the structure of optimal fire distribution policies is examined for tactical situations 
described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. This is done to provide insight into such important 
questions as 
(1) How should fire be distributed over targets? 
(2) Do target priorities change with time? 
(3) Does the number of target types affect the optimal distribution of fire? 
(4) Do battle termination circumstances affect the optimal allocation policies? 
(5) How does the nature of the attrition process affect the optimal distribution of fire? 
(6) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat affect the optimal distribution rules? 
A theory of tactical allocation is developed through the examination of a sequence of simplified models. 
These combat models are too simple to be taken literally but should be interpreted as indicating 
general principles to serve as hypotheses for subsequent computer simulation studies or field experi- 
mentation. 
In 1964 Dolansky [9] noted that the Lanchester theory of combat was insufficiently developed in 
the area of target selection for combat between heterogeneous forces (optimal controYdifferentia1 
games). Even the two references cited by him, Weiss [31] and Isbell and Marlow [14], have been sub- 
sequently extended by this author 1241, [261 Since Dolansky’s article, no further examples have been 
published in the literature except for the ones in Isaacs’ book [131 This previous work had never 
systematically investigated the dependence of optimal tactics upon model form. 
*This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research as part of the Foundation Research Program at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
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Several idealized fire distribution problems are examined. The combat situations are described by 
Lanchester-type equations over a period of time with choices of tactics available to one side and subject 
to change over time. These problems are solved by the mathematical theory of optimal control. A fur- 
ther elaboration on solution development is to be found in the author’s report [21]. 
The body of this paper is organized in the following fashion. First, a sequence of problems is con- 
sidered, and the effect on the optimal distribution of fire is examined for the following factors: objectives 
of the combatants, termination conditions of the conflict, number of target types, some special cases 
of time dependent attrition-rate coefficients, and type of attrition process. Then, two-sided extensions 
of such problems are discussed, but the value of studying one-sided problems as considered in this 
paper is pointed out. Finally, various implications of the models are discussed. 
2. NOTATION 
The symbols which are used in this paper are defined as follows: 
a ] ,  . . . , an, b l ,  . . . , bn= constant attrition-rate coefficients, 
~ ( t )  , a z ( t ) ,  bl ( t )  , bz ( t )  = variable attrition-rate coefficients, 
q ( C )  for i = l ,  . . ., n=coefficient of 41 in maximization problem (defined by Equation (14)). 
Ci for i = l ,  2, 3, 4, 5 =  the i th part of the terminal surface (“target set”) as defined in section 3.2., 
e((7) for i =  1, . . ., n =  coefficient d +i in maximization problem (defined by Equation (23)), 
h ( t )  = variable portion of variable attrition-rate coefficient, e.g., ai(t)= k n l h ( t ) ,  
H = Hamiltonian function, 
k =  constant of proportionality, 
k,,, k,,, k b , ,  k b r =  constant portions of variable attrition-rate coefficients, e.g., a l ( t ) =  k a , h ( t ) ,  
L =  singular “surface” defined by alblxl= azbzxz,  
L ’ =  line (with equation alpxl = a p q x z )  in description of solution to Problem 5, 
n = number of X-force target types, 
Po= ( x ! ,  . . ., xO,, yo) = point in the initial state space, 
p ,  q, r =  utilities assigned per unit of surviving X I ,  XZ, and y forces, respectively, 
p i ( t )  for i = l ,  . . ., n + l = d u a l  variable corresponding t o x i ( t ) ( z n + l ( t ) = y ( t ) ) ,  
R=aibr / (azh) ,  
Ri for i = l ,  . . ., n-l=ar(biw,-bnwi)/(arbi-anbn),  
Si for i = l ,  . . ., n = a i ( b i w k - b k W i ) / ( a i b i - a k b k ) ,  
i t &  
t =  time after beginning of battle, 
t r =  T - T ~ =  time which separates Phase I of the battle in Problem 5 from Phase I1 as described 
in section 3.5.1. 
T =  total time for the battle, 
Tl = maximum possible duration for battle, i.e., T 
wlr . . ., wn, u =  utilities assigned per unit of surviving X I ,  . . ., X n ,  Y forces, respectively, 
xl ,  . . . , xnr y= average force strengths; with initial values x ; ,  . . . , x:, yo, 
7‘1, 
v&= q(Ri-WQQn/bn + t)’, 
I V k = Q n ( b & w n - b n u l & ) / ( U k b & - U n b n ) ,  
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1 for i = j ,  
0 otherwise, &j= Kronecker delta = 
4=fraction of Y-fire directed at XI, 
4i=fraction of Y-fire directed at Xi, 
4*= optimal control, 
 backwards time” from the end of the battle; defined by T = T - ~ ,  i.e. the time remaining 
71, 7 2 ,  etc.=“backwards time” of the first, second, etc., switch in tactics. 
before the end of the battle, 
3. SOME FIRE DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS 
A theory of optimal fire distribution is developed by examining a sequence of problems and then 
contrasting the structures of the optimal fire distribution policies for these problems. In this manner 
the effect of the model’s form on the optimal policy will be illustrated. Five different fire distribution 
problems are considered in order to study the effect of the model’s form on the structure of the optimal 
policy by contrasting the solutions to these problems. The problems that are considered are for the 
optimal distribution of fire of a homogeneous force, denoted as Y, in Lanchester combat against hetero- 
geneous forces, denoted as XI through X,. These problems are summarized in Table I. The effects of 
the following four factors on the optimal allocation policy may be inferred from this study: number of 
target types, target-type attrition process, time variations in attrition-rate coefficients, and battle termi- 
nation conditions. 
TABLE I. Summary of Problems Considered to Study Effect of Model Form on Optimal Fire Distribution 
Policy 
Explanation of Symbols 
Target-type Attrition Process 
and targets 
L =  “linear-law” attrition process= attrition rate proportional to product of numbers of firers 
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S = “square-law” attrition process = attrition rate proportional to only number of firers 
C= constant 
V =  variable 
PD= prescribed duration battle (special case of X I  > 0, xz > 0, y > 0) 
TC = terminal control battle (fight-to-the-finish) 
Attrition-Rate Coefficients 
Battle Termination Conditions 
3.1. Battle of Prercribed Duration (Two Target Types) 
The simplest fire distribution problem is for combat between an X-force of two force types (for 
example, riflemen and grenadiers) and a homogeneous Y-force (for example, riflemen only). This situa- 
tion is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. It is the objective of the Y-force commander to maximize 
his survivors at the end of battle at time T and minimize those of his opponent (considering weighting 
factors p ,  q ,  and r). This is accomplished through his choice of the fraction of fire, 4, directed at XI. 
However, this idealized tactical allocation problem may be studied in two different scenarios: (1) a 
battle lasting a specified length of time (denoted as TI ) or (2) a battle lasting until one side or the other 
i8 totally annihilated. Each of these situations will be analyzed separately. 
FIGURE 1. Diagram offie distribution problem 
Thus, Problem 1 is a prescribed duration battle. (The reader should recall that the dehitions of 
Problems 1 through 5 are given in Table I.) It is stated in mathematical terms below. 
(Problem 1) maximize { ry( T) - p q  ( T) - qxz (T) } with TI specified, 
W) 
subject to: - d x l -   - 4QlY.  dt 
where all symbols are defined in section 2. above. 
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Case 
A: alp 3 axq 
3.1.1. Optimal Policy in a Special Case 
The battle lasts for 0 d t 
(1) z r ( T ) = z 2 ( T ) = 0  and T a T l ,  
(2) y ( T ) = O  and T d  TI, 
(3) T=Ti, 
TI unless, of course, one side or the other is annihilated before TI. To 
be more precise, the battle terminates under one of the following three conditions: 
where T denotes the time at which the battle ends. However, to avoid inessential complications only 
the special case in which X I  (T) > 0, zz( T) > 0, y(  T) > 0, and T=TI is considered for the comparisons 
made in this paper. In other words, those subcases in which a state variable is reduced to zero are not 
considered.* Thus, it is assumed that the initial force levels are such that no force type is annihilated 
during this prescribed duration battle. 
The solution to Problem 1 for the above special case is shown in Table 11. A derivation of these 
results is omitted, since Problem 1 may be considered to be a special case of Problem 3 for which a 
derivation is provided. 
TABLE 11. Solution to Fire Distribution Problem (Problem 1 )  Battle of Prescribed Duration with 
Constant Attrition-Rate Coefiients; Special Case in which x1 ( T )  > 0, x2  (T) > 0, y ( T )  > 0 
(Nonrestrictive assumption: Q I ~ I  >at&) 
Optimal Control 
4*(t )  = 1 for 0 S t s T 
(a) for T, 3 T 
4’(t) = 0 for 0 s t < T I----- (b) for TI < T B: a lp  < QrQ 
NOTE: The “backwards” switching time is given by 
R - 6  
where I= -R-1’ 
3.1.2. Discussion of Structure of Optimal Policy 
With reference to Table 11, two characteristics of the optimal allocation policies for this particular 
(1) all fire is always concentrated on one target type; 
(2) the allocation is not (directly) dependent upon the force levels. 
prescribed duration battle are: 
‘In the above problem zlr X Z .  and y are called state variables, while 4 is called a control variable. A constraint such as xI B 0 
is called a state variable inequality constraint (SVIC) and requires special treatment (see chapter 6 of (191). Moreover, McIntyre 
and Paiewonsky [18] remarked in 1967 that “the optimal control problem with state space constraints does not appear to be well 
understood.” The personal experience of this author bears this out [23]. 
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It will be seen later that when there are more than two target types in this scenario, the solution pos- 
sesses these same characteristics (even when the attrition rates change over time). Both these charac- 
teristics, however, are consequences of the assumed model form. 
The first characteristic, concentration of effort on one alternative, is a consequence of the “square- 
law” attrition process for the X-forces. (The attrition of a target type will be referred to as being a 
“square-law” process when the casualty rate is proportional to the number of enemy firers only and 
as being a “linear-law** process when it is proportional to the product of the numbers of enemy firers 
and remaining targets.) It will be shown in section 3.3.2. that this makes the existence of a singular 
control [15] impossible, and hence the optimal allocation policies are extreme points in the control 
variable space. 
There is, however, a very simple principle which underlies the above mathematical formalities: 
concentration of effort when constant marginal returns are obtained from the alternatives and the total 
effort is limited. Constant marginal effect over time per unit of weapon system is a property of the 
square-law” attrition process; this is readily seen from considering the XI-force attrition (when t$= 1) 4‘ 
-- rate of casualties produced per . 
unit of Y-force weapon system - Q1= 
\- dt) 
Y 
Thus there is a constant (or nondiminishing) marginal effect over time. This should be contrasted with 
the situation for a “linear-law” attrition of the X1-forc.es, 
rate of casualties produced per . 
unit of Y-force weapon system 
-- (- 2) - u1x1= 
Y 
In this there are diminishing effects over time from allocating a unit of Y-force weapon system against 
XI, and a division of total effort (i.e., fraction of fire) may be called for. B. Koopman’s 1953 article [17] 
contains an excellent discussion of such principles which underlie such an optimization problem. 
Presently, these heuristic arguments will be verified in a mathematically precise fashion when a 
dynamic model, which considers the interaction of forces over time and in which both X-force target 
types undergo “linear-law*’ attrition, is considered. This fundamental difference in the structure of 
optimal allocation policies based on the nature of target attrition makes the selection of the appro- 
priate attrition process an essential task of analysis. 
The second characteristic, the optimal allocation not (directly) dependent upon the force levels, 
is due to the combination of the “square-law” attrition process for the X-force types and the fixed 
battle length. T. It is seen that for the special case of this prescribed duration battle in which xi(T) > 
0, x s ( T )  > 0, and y ( T )  > 0 the optimal distribution of fire depends only on the attrition rates of the 
various force types and relative weights assigned to surviving force types. This is not surprising, since 
the adjoint differential equations (see section 3.3.2. below) are independent of the state variables, and the 
values of the dual variables at the end of battle t = T are independent of force strengths. It is recalled 
that a dual variable represents the rate of change of the payoff (battle outcome as measured by the 
value of surviving forces at t = T )  with respect to a particular state variable [2]. 
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It seems appropriate to discuss further the interpretation of the solution shown in Table 11. From 
the above definition of the dual variables, 
effect on outcome per unit)- ( kill rate of ) effect on outcome per . ( unit of X1 destroyed - Y against X1 
Hence, the condition alp < azq means that at the end of the battle (recall that p l ( t = T ) = - p ,  etc.) 
there is greater effect on battle outcome (as measured by value of survivors) per unit time per soldier 
for Y to engage X2 (short term gain at the end of battle). The value of the dual variable, for example, 
p l ( t )  reflects both the value assigned XI-force survivors and the dynamic interaction of forces over 
time through the Lanchester-type equations. Hence, it also accounts for the effectiveness of X1 against 
Y. The quantity atbl may be interpreted as representing the instantaneous rate of destruction of the 
X1-force kill rate against the Y-force per unit of Y-force. Then albl > a262 means that there is greater 
strategic value for engaging the X1-force, i.e., more long range return. Thus, Case A of Table I1 cor- 
responds to when there is both more long range and also short range return for engaging XI. Case B 
corresponds to when there is more short term gain at the end of the battle for engaging X2, but more 
long range return for engaging XI. It is easily shown that Case A results when Y values surviving XI- 
forces greater than or equal to in direct proportion to their kill rate against the Y-force, i.e., p / q  B 61/b2. 
A switch in tactics (target priority) is seen to occur for this model only when value is not assigned to 
Xl survivors (recall that engagement of XI always yields more “long range return”) greater than or equal 
to in proportion to their destructive capability (kill rate). 
The maximum principle may be interpreted as saying that a target type from several alternatives 
is engaged when such an engagement yields the greatest favorable effect on battle outcome per unit 
time. It turns out, though, that the evolution of target engagement return is dependent upon the sce- 
nario chosen for the study of the problem. This is clearly seen when we examine the “fight-to-the-finish.” 
This is a special case of a terminal control battle (the dombat ends only when the course of battle has 
been steered to a prescribed end state) and is chosen for mathematical convenience. 
3.2. Terminal Control Battle (Two Target Types)  
below. 
Problem 2 is a terminal control battle (a “fight-to-the-finish”) and is stated in mathematical terms 
(Problem 2) 
maximize { r y ( T ) - p x l ( T ) - q x z ( T ) }  with T unspecified, 
64) 
subject to: 
where all symbols are defined in section 2. above. 
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The stopping rule for this battle is that the conflict terminates at  t = T defined by 
Upon further analysis it has been convenient to consider that there are the following five “target sets” 
for Problem 2: 
The reader should note that in the above problem statement T is referred to as being undetermined. 
This is because T is determined by entry to one of the above five target sets. In turn, this depends 
upon the control used, and hence before an allocation rule is given, it is unspecified. 
Problem 2 was first studied by Isbell and Marlow [14] in 1956. However, their solution was not 
correct for all values of model parameters, since they did not discover the dispersal surfaces (see 
pp. 132-141 of [13]) present in this problem’s solution for a certain range of model parameters. A more 
complete solution has been given by the author in a previous paper [24]. The solution principles for 
solving such an optimal control problem may be extended to the special class of terminal control 
differential games which have pure strategy solutions. This was done by the author in [26] and used 
to solve the supporting weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [31]. 
In describing the solution to Problem 2 (see [24] for the details of its development) three cases 
must be considered 
(1) 6 2  1 ,  
(2) R -  V R ( R - 1 )  6 <  1 ,  
(3) 0 C 6 < R -  V R ( R - 1 ) ,  
where 6=alp / (apq) .  The solution for each of these cases is given in [24]. Moreover, these appearingly 
complex results may be summarized in a particularly simple fashion* (for the nonrestrictive assump- 
tion that R > 1 ,  i.e., albl > apb2). When Y wins, he engages XI until depletion before X2. When Y loses, 
he may switch from firing at XI entirely to firing at X2 entirely before the XI force has been annihilated. 
This happens in Case (2) (R - VR (R - 1) 6 < 1 )  when survivors of force-type Xp are assigned utility 
in excess of their Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient as compared with force-type XI, and certain 
relationships hold between initial force strengths. Thus, in contrast to the prescribed duration battle 
(Problem l), the optimal policy for Problem 2 may depend on initial force levels. 
Finally, it seems appropriate to point out that the “backwards” switching time, denoted as 7], i? 
different in these two problems. Let 7 1  (Problem 1) denote the “backwards” switching time for an op 
timal policy in Problem 1. It represents the optimal length of time that Y fires at Xz before the end o 
*Thus, for comparison purposes of the present paper the complete solution need nut be given here. 
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battle at t = T  when alp < a29 (for the special case in which x l ( T )  > 0, X Z ( T )  > 0, y ( T )  > 0, and 
71  s T). It is convenient to define 
From Table I1 it is seen that 
1 z+ V z 2 + a * - l  
a2 b2 l + a  n ( a ) =  In 
~ 
T~ (Problem I )=TI(Q= i d$). 
It is assumed that r is a strictly positive quantity. Furthermore, in Problem 2 71 denotes the backwards 
time at which c$* changes from 0 to 1 (in backwards progression) with X I  (T=  T I )  > 0, i.e., the time of a 
change in the optimal distribution of fire without the annihilation of a target type. In [24] it was shown 
that 
(3) TI  (Problem 2 ) = 7 ] ( a = O ) .  
Then, it is easy to show that when 6= alp/(asq) < 1,  it follows that T I  (Problem 1) < TI (Problem 2) 
and in such a case Y fires at X2 for a longer period of time in Problem 2 than in Problem 1. This is stated 
as Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 1: Assume that 6 < 1 and r > 0. Then 
71 (Problem 1) < T~ (Problem 2). 
By observing (2) and (3) and recalling that q, r > 0, we can see that the theorem follows by showing 
aT1 
aa 
that - < 0 for 6 < 1. It is readily computed from (1) that 
(4) 
Now 6 < 1 (recalling the nonrestrictive assumption R > 1) implies that z > 1,  so that 
a < za < z d z 2 +  a2 - 1, (5) 
since a > 0. From (5) it follows that 
(6) a + l - - z 2 - z  V z 2 + . 2 - 1 < 0 ,  
a which proves that aa < 0 for 6 < 1. 
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3.3. Prescribed Duration Battle with Several Target Types 
The first two problems were considered in order to contrast the structures of the optimal allocation 
policies for different battle termination conditions. Another factor that can be examined is the number of 
target types. For the prescribed duration battle certain facets which tended to be obscured in the sce- 
nario with two target types are brought into sharper focus when n target types are considered. 





(Problem 3) maximize { vy(  T) - wixt (7')) with TI specified, 
&fit)  1= I 




xi, y 2 0, $11 2 0 for i =  1, . . . , n and 4i= 1. 
1=1 
3.3.1. Optimal Policy in a Special Care 
The battle lasts for 0 6 t Q TI unless, of course, one side or the other is annihilated before TI. To be 
more precise, the battle terminates under one of the following three conditions: 
(1) n l ( T ) =  . . . = z , ( T ) = O a n d T s T ~ ,  
(2) A T )  = O  and T Q TI, 
(3)  T=TI ,  
where T denotes the time at which the battle ends. However, for the comparisons made in this paper, 
only the special case in which X I  (T) > 0, . . . nn( T) > 0, y ( T )  > 0 ,  and T= TI is considered. Thus, as 
done in section 3.1.1. it is assumed that the initial force levels are such that no force type is annihilated 
during this prescribed duration battle. 
The solution to Problem 3 for the above special case is shown in Table Ill. A derivation of these 
results is given in the next section. In Table Ill 6i.j denotes the Kronecker delta and is equal to 1 for 
i = j  and zero otherwise. It is seen that the solution to Problem 3 turns out to be a generalization of that 
to Problem 1. However, certain aspects receive greater emphasis to provide one with a deeper under- 
standing of the phenomena under study. In particlular, two subcases, denoted as Case A and Case B, 
were considered in the solution to Problem 1 (see Table 11). When there are several target types, the 
generalization of the subcases, which it is convenient to distinguish, is as follows: 
Case A, enemy survivors valued in direct proportion to their kill rate against Y-force, 
Case B, enemy survivors not valued in direct proportion to their kill rate against Y-force. 
In the first instance, Case A, target priorities keep their same relative ranking over time. If the 
highest priority target type is exterminated during such a battle, then fire is merely shifted to the next 
highest priority target. Hence, when one values enemy survivors in proportion to their kill rate against 
you, i.e., wi=kbi,  for i =  1, . . ., n,  the optimal tactic is to concentrate all fire on a single target type 
until it is entirely destroyed. The sole criterion for target selection in this instance is the quantity a h ,  
which may be interpreted to be the rate of destruction of enemy attrition capability for his ith force type 
(see section 3.1.2). 
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Case 
A : w r = k b c f o r i = l , .  . ..n 
TABLE 111. Solution to Fire Distribution Problem (Problem 3)  Battle of Prescribed Duration with 
Constant Attrition Rates; Special Case in Which X I  (2‘) > O  for i = l ,  . . ., n and y ( T )  > O  
Optimal Control 
& * ( t ) = 6 u f o r O S t s T  
i = l ,  . . ., n 
9: W I  # kbc for at least one index i (a) for TI a T 
$ i * ( t )  = 81, for 0 6 t s T 
i = l , .  . . n 
NOTES: 
(1) 1 is index such that QJbJ=max (albl.  . . ., a.6.). 
(2) n is index assigned so that anwn= max ( Q I W I .  . . .. Q n W n ) .  
at(brwm-bnw1) (3) k is index such that Rr= min (RI ,  . . ., &-I)  where Re= f o r i = l . .  . .,n-1. 
RIM a h  - a.n. 
aPc’anb. 
1 
(4) 71 is given by TI = - m” In 
for i = l ,  . . ., n. QI (biWk - bkwc) (5) j is index such that Sj=min (SI,  . . ., Sn) where S I =  
S 1 M  acbc - akbk l*k 
“Pl”kbk 
(7) 73 is ljven by expression similar to those for 71 and TO above. 
With reference to Table I11 in Case B it is seen that there may be one or more switches in target 
priorities if the battle lasts long enough. For example, in subcase (b) of Case B of Table I11 a switch in 
the optimal tactic of concentrating all fire on one target type occurs, and fire is shifted from target type 
k to target type n. It will be shown that necessary conditions for fire to be switched from target type k to 
n are that a k b k  > anbn  and > %, i.e., fire is shifted from a target type which causes attrition in a 
geater  proportion than the ratio of values placed upon survivors to the target type which yields the 
greatest direct return at the end of battle. Additionally, in Table I11 explicit expressions are given for 
“switching times” as well as for the determination of the target type upon which all fire is concentrated. 
b k  
Wn 
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It should be noted that when n = 2  the results of Table I11 reduce to those given in Table 11. To see 
this one sets n = 2 and makes the following identifications: WI in Problem 3 is replaced by p in Problem 1, 
and w by q. 
3.3.2. Development of Optinul Fire Dbtribution Policy 
For y > 0 and xi > 0 for i =  1, . . . , n, the Hamiltonian for Problem 3 is given by [8] * 
(7) 
where p i ( t )  for i =  1 ,  . . . , n denotes the dual variable corresponding to xi and p n + i  ( t  ) denotes the dual 
variable corresponding to y. According to the maximum principle, the optimal control (there is only one 
extremal) is determined by the (trivial) linear program 
maximize H ( t ,  x i ,  p i ,  9i) 
subject to: 2 4i=1, 




which in turn leads to 
(8 1 
n 
{ = I  
subject to: 2 + i = l ,  
By inspection the solution to (8) is easily seen to be 
where S, is the Kronecker delta and is equal to 1 for i =  j and zero otherwise and j ( t )  is the index such 
that 
To trace the history of 4i* over time, one must consider the adjoint system of differential equations 
given by 
'There is a difference in sign between the version of the maximum principle used by Pontryagin et al. 1191 and an equivalent 
version commonly used in the control theory literature of this country (see p. 108 of [8]). 
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and 
It may be that the index j ( t )  is not unique, i.e., the linear program (8) has alternate optima, This 
causes no difficulty unless this situation continues for a finite interval of time. When this happens, the 
corresponding segment of the battle trajectory is called a singular subarc [15]. However, it is easily 
shown that it is impossible to have a singular solution of Problem 3. If j ( t )  were not unique for a finite 
interval of time, then (for example) one would have ajpj(t) = a k p k ( t )  for ti S t S t 2 .  If this were to occur, 
then one must have 
or using (10) 
( 1 1 )  
Sincepn+l(t)  > O  for 0s t ST, Equation (11) implies that ajbj=akbk, which, in general, is not true. 
Hence, there is no singular solution to Problem 3 and +i*(t) is either 0 or 1 (almost everywhere). 





Substituting (12) into (8), one obtains after some manipulation that the optimal control is determined by 
n 
maximize 2 ci(t)+ 




subject to: z &= 1,  
41 a 0, 
i- 1 
Hence, it is seen that if u= kbi for i =  1, . . ., n, i.e., Y values enemy survivors in direct proportion to 
their kill rate against his forces, the above problem is equivalent to 
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where use has been made of the easily verified fact that P n ( t )  < 0 for all time. Thus the optimal control 
is given by 
(15) &*(t )  = 60 for 0 dt  d T, 
where J is the index such that 
&=maximum (a lb l ,  . . ., h b n ) .  
Hence, for this problem when one values enemy survivors in direct proportion to their kill rate against 
you, the optimal tactic is to concentrate all fire on a single target type until it is entirely destroyed. The 
result (15) is given in Table 111. 
The more complex case in which one does not value enemy survivors in direct proportion to their 
kill capability (measured by a Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) against you will now be considered. 
Since the solution to this problem is developed by working backwards from the end t = T, it is con- 
venient to introduce the “backwards time” variable r defined by r= T- t .  It is assumed that the enemy 
target types have been indexed so that n is the index such that 
By (8) it is easily seen that 
By straightforward continuity arguments, it is readily seen that 
where 71 is the “backwards time” of the first switch in target selection. Giving consideration to (18) 
and observing that -=--; it is seen that for re[O, 711 one need only consider the following equa- 




and it is recalled that (rewriting (12)) 
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The above initial value problem (19) is routinely solved to yield 
p n ( 7 ) = - w n  cosh GT-v & sinh -7. 
It will now be determined what conditions are necessary for a change in target selection and the 
time at which the change occurs, T I .  To do this it is convenient to rewrite (13) and (14) as 
n 
subject to: 7 c$i= 1, 
=l 
where 
A switch in the optimal distribution of fire occurs at the smallest T for which 
where i =  1, . . ., n - 1 and certain other conditions (to be determined presently) are met. Let k be 
the index of the target type to which fire is first shifted in “backwards time.” Observe that at T = O  
one has 
for i= 1, . . ., n - 1, since the index n has been defined by (16). Then for T ]  < T < 7 2 ,  where TS is the 
“backwards time” of the second switch in target selection, one has that 4:(7) = & k ,  and thus by (22) 
and (23) the following inequality must hold 
which may be rearranged to yield 
It will now be shown that a necessary condition for fire to be shifted from target type n to target 
type k when one works backwards from the end is that U k b k  > a n b n .  The proof is as follows. It will be 
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shown that u k b k  C a n b n  leads to a con'tradiction. First, consider the special case when a k b k = a n b n .  In 
this case (26) reduces to 
or 
But this is a contradiction to (25) which must hold with i = k .  In the case when a n b n  > U k b k ,  then using 
the fact that ( - p n ( 7 ) )  > wn for T > 0, we may write (26) as 
but this leads to Q k W k  > U n W n  which is a contradiction to (25) as before. 
Thus, u k b k  > a n b n  and the switch in target selection occurs at 
(27) 
so that a second necessary condition is 
b k  W k  ->-. 
b n  W n  
In other words, all fire is concentrated at earlier (forward) times in the battle on the target type which 
causes attrition proportionally more than the ratio of values placed on survivors and then is switched 
later to the target type which yields the greatest direct return at the end of battle. 
To recapitulate the above, the target to which fire is first shifted (working backwards from the 
end of battle) has index k determined by 
where 
(29) 
The time of switch, 71, of fire to the kth target type is determined by the equation 
which may be solved to yield the expression for 71 given in Table 111. 
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The general pattern of when and to which target types fire is shifted as one works backwards from 
the end of battle does not emerge until one has considered the second shift in target selection. Since 
-this is dependent upon the evolution of target worth, the backwards integration of the adjoint system 
of differential equations must be further considered. From above, one has that 
where 7 2  is the “backwards time” of the second switch in target selection. Giving consideration to (31), 
it is seen that for T E [ T ~ ,  7 2 1  one needs only to consider the following equations from the adjoint system 
(10) 




Equation (33) follows from the fact that by (8) and (9) at 7’71 we have 
which may be combined with (27), (28), and (29) to yield the desired result. Equation (34) is readily 
deduced by observing that according to (19) a “square law” relates the dual variables Pn(7) and P n + l ( ~ )  
for 0 d 7 G T~ 
whence follows (34) by use of (27), (29), and (32). It should be noted that all the dual variables may be 
expressed in terms of P k ( 7 )  (let n= k in (12)) 
(37) 
Again, the Equations (32) are routinely solved to yield for TE[T~,  7 2 1  
Subsequent arguments are now similar to those given for the first switch in tactics. Let j be the 
index of the target type to which fire is shifted secondly in “backwards time.” Then, it may be shown 
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by similar arguments to above that necessary conditions for fire to be shifted to the j th  target type are 
that 
and 
However, more insight may be gained by rewriting (40) as 
It also seems appropriate to point out the military interpretation of the ratio -. br Recall that 
W i  
wi = value per unit of X i  surviving at t = T, 
bi = kill rate per unit of X i  against Y. 
Then 
bi - kill rate per unit of X i  . 
wi value per unit of X I  survivors 
- _  
Thus, it is seen that as one progresses backwards from the end of battle that fire is always shifted to 
target types with larger ratios of kill rate per unit of weapon system per unit value of survivors. 
Using an argument similar to the one used to develop (28) and (29) for the first shift in fire, it may be 
shown that the target to which fire is shifted secondly (working backwards from the end of battle) has 
index j determined by 
where 
(43) 
The time of switch, 7 2 ,  of fire to the jth target type is determined by the transcendental equation 
which may be solved to yield the expression for 7 2  given in Table 111. Further shifts in fire follow the 
pattern established above. 
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3.3.3. Discurrion of Structure of Optimal Policy 
Considering Table 111, it is seen that the optimal allocation policy for Problem 3 has the same 
structure as that for Problem 1 with just two target types: 
(1) fire is always concentrated on one target type, 
(2) the allocation is not directly dependent upon the force levels. 
The addition of more target types has not changed the nature of the problem: its explicit solution is a 
generalization of that with two X-force target types. 
It is of interest to ask whether the optimal tactic will always be to concentrate fire on only one target 
type (bang-bang optimal control). The answer to this question turns out to be “no” as consideration of 
Problem 5 with a “linear-law” attrition process for the X-force target types will show. The reader is 
referred to section 3.1.2. for a further heuristic discussion of the structure of the optimal policy for the 
distribution of fire over target types which undergo attrition at a rate proportional to only the number of 
firers. 
3.4. Some Special Cases of Time Dependent Attrition-Rate Coefficients 
In the previous idealizations of combat that have been considered above, it has been assumed that 
all the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients were constant. In reality, such a coefficient depends upon 
numerous factors some of which are as follows: hit probabilities, weapon system projectile-target 
lethality characteristics, rates of fire, rate of target acquisition. These factors themselves may be range 
dependent or change over time. S. Bonder [5], [6] has developed explicit formulas for relating the 
Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient to weapons system performance characteristics such as those 
mentioned above. 
Thus, it seems appropriate to examine idealized combat situations in which the attrition-rate 
coefficients are time dependent. Moreover, this is facilitated by the author’s research results on solu- 
tions to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations for “square-law” attrition processes [22], [27]. 
A key result is that there is a class of variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations (combat between 
two homogeneous forces when the attrition-rate coefficents are variable provided that their ratio is 
constant) which possess a solution no more complicated than the solution to the constant coefficient 
case [El. This type of property (reflecting the physical situation in which two weapon systems cause 
attrition in a proportional fashion at all times) will now be exploited in an optimal control problem. 
Thus, Problem 4 is a prescribed duration battle and is stated in mathematical terms below. 
maximize { r y ( t )  - -pzl(T)  -qxp(T) }  with T1 specified, 
44t ) (Problem 4) 
dxi subject to: - = - + u ~ ( t ) y ,  dt 
* = -bl ( t  ) x ,  - bz ( t  1x2, 
dt 
x , ,  x ~ ,  y 3 0, 0 s 4 s 1, and T T I .  
It is assumed that both X-force weapon systems are such that 
* 
As done above for Problems 1 and 3, only the special case in which xI ( T )  > 0 ,  z z ( T )  > 0,  y ( T )  > 0, 
and T =  T1 is considered for the comparisons made in this paper. In the further special case in which the 
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TABLE IV. Solution to Fire Distribution Problem (Problem 4 )  Battle of Prescribed Duration with 
Variable Attrition-Rate coefiients; Special Case in Which X I  ( T )  > 0,  x z  ( T )  > 0 ,  y ( T )  >O 
Special assumption: al(t)/a2(t) = k a , / k a . .  b l ( t ) lbr( t )=kb, /kb, ,  and al(t)/bl(t) = k a , / k b ,  
Nonrertrictive arrumption: k&, > k.& 
I Case I Optimal Control I 
(a) for T~ b T 
4 * ( t ) = O  f o r O < t < T  
(b) for T I  < T 
for 0 t =s T-71 
for T-71 =Z t Q T 
& * ( I ) =  
NOTE: The "backwards,: switching time is given by 
where 
Y-force values surviving X-force types in direct proportion to their kill rates (as measured by the Lan- 
Chester attrition-rate coefficients) against the Y-force, i.e., p / q =  kb,/kb,= bl ( t) /h(t)  = bl ( t  = T ) /  
& ( t  = T) , the optimal control law takes a particularly simple form 
In this instance target selection depends only on the product of attrition-rate coefficients which may be 
interpreted as the rate of destruction of enemy kill-rate capability. All fire is concentrated on one of the 
target types depending on which target type has the larger product of attrition-rate coefficients. Target 
priority is subject to change over time as the ranking of thz target types on this decision criterion 
changes. It is conceivable that the optimal tactic may be to shift fire from one target type to the other 
several times over the course of battle with the duration of battle not having any effect. Observe that no 
assumptions at all have been made on the Y-force attrition rates against XI and XZ, i.e., a1 ( t )  and uZ(t). 
It i i  now further assumed that a l ( t ) = k a , h ( t )  and aZ( t )=ka,h( t ) .  This means that not only is the 
ratio of the X-force weapon system attrition rates against the Y-force constant, but also the ratio of the 
Y-force effectiveness against each of the two X-force types. Furthermore, all four attrition-rate coeffi- 
cients have the same time dependence except for constant factors. The solution is shown in Table IV. 
In this special case it is seen that the structure of the optimal allocation policies when the attrition-rate 
coefficients are variable is essentially identical to that in which they are constant. Only the time scale 
has been transformed (in [22] this type of observation was first made by the author (see also [25)). 
The development of the above results is omitted due to considerations of the length of the paper at 
hand. Their development and that of further such results are to be found in [ZB]. Moreover, it has been 
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important to include the above results here, since the purpose of the paper at hand is to contrast the 
solutions for a sequence of related problems. 
Finally, it should be noted that when h ( t )  = 1 the results of Table IV reduce to those for Problem 1 
given in Table 11. To see this one sets h ( t  ) = 1 and makes the following identifications: k,, in Problem 4 
is replaced by al in Problem 1, ko, by a2, kb, by b ~ ,  and ka, by bz. 
3.5. Fire Distribution for Targete Undergoing “Linear-Law” Attrition 
So far in the state equations describing combat the attrition rate of each X-force target type has 
been proportional to only the number of Y-force firers. Considering Equations [7], [9], and [30] which 
give rise to the classical Lanchester square law, this may be referred to (somewhat imprecisely) as a 
square-law” attrition process of target types.* H. Weiss [30] has given a thorough discussion of the 
conditions which lead to such an attrition process. These conditions include that “each unit is informed 
about the location of the remaining opposing units so that when a target is destroyed, fire may be 
immediately shifted to a new target.” It is thus noted that the control theory models which we have 
considered so far have implicitly assumed perfect information in the above sense. 
Another model for target type attrition is one in which the attrition rate (of each X-force target 
type) is proportional to the product of the numbers of targets and firers. This may be referred to (again 
somewhat imprecisely) as a “linear-law” attrition process of target types. Such an attrition process 
can arise under two different general circumstances: (1) fire is uniformly distributed over a constant 
target area (“area fire”), or (2) the mean time of target acquisition is much larger than target destruction 
time and is inversely proportional to target density. Again, quoting Weiss [30], it is assumed that units 
are informed about the general areas in which opposing units are located, but are not informed about 
the consequences of their own fire. Brackney [7] has shown that “aimed fire” may lead to a linear-law 
attrition process of targets when target acquisition times are considered and are as postulated above. 
Thus, Problem 5 is a battle in which the attrition of each X-force target type is a linear-law process 
and is stated in mathematical terms below. 
“ 
(Problem 5) maximize{ry(T) - p x l ( T )  - q x 2 ( T ) }  with TI specified, 
Q( 0 
- + l x l Y ,  subject to: -= dx 1 dt 
&= - ( 1 -  f#J)azxzy, dt 
xl, x 2 ,  y 3 0 ,  0 s 6 S 1, and T s  TI. 
The analysis details upon which the summary given below is based are given in a companion paper [29] 
(see also pp. 91-105 of [21]) due to their rather lengthy nature. Moreover, it is important that these 
results be given here so that one can see the effect of the combat attrition model on the structure of 
the optimal allocation policy by contrasting, for example, the solution to Problem 1 with that for 
Problem 5. 
*The reader should keep in mind that the Y-forces are faced with the problem of determining the optimal distribution 
of fire over X-force target types. 
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3.5.1. Description of Optimal Fire Distribution Policy 
There is a fundamental difference between the solution to Problem 5 and those considered 
previously: the optimal allocation, 4*, may be other than 0 or 1. In contrast to those for Problems 1 
through 4, the optimal allocation policy does not have to be an extreme point of the control variable 
space at all times: one may have a singular solution [15] for which the necessary condition of maximizing 
the Hamiltonian (with respect to the control variable) does not provide a well-defined expression for 
the extremal control. That part of an optimal trajectory on which the maximum principle does not 
determine the control is called a singular subarc, and the term “singular solution” will be used to refer 
to any optimal trajectory which contains one or more singular subarcs. 
Singular solutions usually occur when the Hamiltonian (denoted as H) is a linear function of the 
control variable(s). According to the notational conventions adopted in this paper, when this happens, 
then if - = 0 for a finite interval of time, the maximum principle does not determine the control 
Observe that when - aH - 0 and H is a linear function of 4, all feasible values of I#J are optimal All 
problems, however, for which the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the control variables do not have 
singular subarcs in their solution. In particular, the reader should note that it has been shown above 
that it is impossible to have a singular solution to Problem 1 through Problem 4. This was done, for 
aH = o for a finite interval of time example, for Problem 4 by showing that it is impossible for - 
when -= 0. Moreover, there is a special second order necessary condition of local optimality 
(generalized Legendre-Cle$sch condition) [16] which must be satisfied in order that a singular subarc 
can yield a maximum return. This is satisfied for the problem at hand [29]. 
The optimal battle trajectories are constructed by working backwards from all possible end points 
of this idealized battle [29]. Consideration is given to both the optimal control at  the end of battle 
and also how the variables upon which it depends vary over time. Based upon such considerations, there 
are three cases to be considered: 






P > -1 b 
q b2’  
Case ( b )  
P, -1 b 
q bz’ Case (c) 
Consider Case (a) first. The solution for this case is shown in Figure 2. Even though explicit expres- 
sions have not been obtained for certain model parameters, the dependence of the optimal control upon 
these quantities can still be qualitatively discussed. The optimal control depends on the state variables 
x1 and x2 (and also the attrition coefficients) in each “decision region.” Above the line alblxl=u263.22, 
denoted as L,  the optimal control +* = 0 is used until this line is encountered. When L is reached the 
singular control 4* = - ,which keeps the trajectory on L, is used until the end of the battle at t =  T. 
That portion of an optimal trajectory which lies on L (for a finite interval of time) is a singular subarc. The 
a2 
U l + a z  
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X I  
FIGURE 2. Optimal allocation for linear-law attrition (Case a )  
time history of the optimal control is traced for two particular initial force ratios denoted as points A and 
D in Figure 2. At point D, --> - and +* = 1 is used until the line L is encountered at point E. 4 a2b2 
aibi 
The solution for Case (b)  is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3. It is similar to the preceding case 
except that another line, L’ with equation a l p x ~ = a ~ q x 2 ,  plays a role in the solution in addition to the 
singular “surface” denoted as L. This line L’ appears above, on, or below the line L (with equation 
1, bi alblxl= a 2 h )  depending upon whether - is greater than, equal to, or less than -- 
Q bz 
The significance of the line L’ and its relationship to the line L is as follows. The battle is divided 
T. During Phase I into two time phases: Phase I for 0 s t d t l=  T - 7 ,  and Phase I1 for T - T I = ~ ~  s t 
X I  
FIGURE 3. Optimal allocation for linear-law attrition (Case b )  
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the optimal target engagement policy at a point in time is determined by the location of the point on the 
battle trajectory with respect to the line L ,  which is also the singular “surface.” Above L, + * ( t )  = O ;  
while below L ,  + * ( t )  = 1. When a battle trajectory reaches L ,  it remains on the singular surface through 
use of the singular control +* = - . During Phase I1 the optimal target engagement policy is to use 
t$*(t )= 1 below L’ and + * ( t )  = O  above L’. The proof of the above statements is given in [29]. 
Thus for any optimal trajectory which lies below L‘ (such as those denoted in Figure 3 as (2), (3). and 
(4)) the optimal control is +*= 1 during Phase 11. Moreover, the time t i=  T-71 appears in Figure 3, for 
example, as when the optimal control for (3) switches from +*=a2/(al+ a2) to +*= 1. Any optimal 
trajectory which lies entirely above L‘ , such as (l), has a corresponding optimal control of +* ( t  ) = 0 for 
0 S t S T, whereas 2 similar remark holds for any one that lies entirely below L, such as (5). Case (c) is 
symmetric to Case (b). 
3.5.2. Diecumion of Structure of Optimal Policy 
a2 
al + a2 
As noted above (see sections 3.1.2. and 3.3.1.)* the structure of the optimal allocation policies in these 
tactical allocation problems is dependent upon how the Y-force values the surviving X-force types rela- 
tive to their kill rate against the Y-force. Case (a): -=- above is when Y assigns utility to surviving 
X-force types in exact proportion to their destructive capability against Y.  In this case, the optimal target 
selection tactic depends only upon the state of the system as is seen with reference to Figure 2. The 
optimal tactic is to use +*( t )  = 0 above the line L with equation alblxl = a262x2. The line L also repre- 
sents an “equilibrium” trajectory which the system follows whenever this line is reached. Case (b): ’ > - is when y assigns a greater value to surviving XI’S than in proportion to their kill rate against y 
relative to that of X2.  Again, the optimal tactic depends upon the state of the system, only this depend- 
ence itself depends upon the “time phase” of the fixed length battle. 
Based on the above examination of Problem 5, it is seen that the structure of the optimal allocation 
policies for targets which undergo a linear-law attrition process has the following characteristics: 
P bl 




(1) fire may be divided between target types, 
(2) the allocation is (directly) dependent upon the force levels. 
These characteristics should be contrasted with those previously observed when target types undergo a 
square-law attrition process (see sections 3.1.2. and 3.3.3.). When there is a linear-law attrition process of 
target types, the optimal allocation policy may be other than 0 or 1. Also, the allocation depends upon 
the force levels of target types. An explanation for this structure of optimal allocation policies in terms 
of the nature of the attrition process has been given in section 3.1.2. 
4. EXTENSIONS TO DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
Even though it is certainly true that combat is an environment of conflicting interests in which the 
potential actions of both friendly and enemy forces must be considered, there is much to be learned from 
one-sided dynamic optimization models. The author views these simplified idealizations presented here 
as “building blocks” for more sophisticated scenarios. It is felt, moreover, that an understanding of the 
structure of optimal tactics for these initial models is essential before one continues his examination of 
a sequence of models of greater and greater complexity. Hence, it seems appropriate to review the inti- 
mate connection between optimal control theory and differential games. 
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It has been stated that optimal control problems may be viewed as one-sided differential games for 
which the roles of all but one of the competing players have been suppressed [2]. Conversely, differential 
games may be viewed as two-sided optimal control problems [12]. A concise discussion of the inter- 
relationships between these two subjects is contained in Y. C. Ho’s [ll] excellent review of Isaacs’ 
book [13] (see also chapter 9 of [8]). 
It should be recalled (see [24]) that the existing theory of (zero-sum deterministic) differential 
games is only applicable to problems for which the criterion functional has a saddle point in pure 
strategies. However, it may be shown (considering the results of A. Friedman (see chapters 5 and 6 of 
[lOD) that the structure of two-sided fire distribution problems in the Lanchester theory of combat as  
formulated by Isbell and Marlow [14] and Weiss (see pp. 94-95 of [30) guarantees the existence of 
pure strategy solutions. This need not be true for other dynamical structures. For example, when 
defensive capabilities were considered in the attrition process in a tactical air war game extensively 
studied at RAND, the resulting model did not possess a solution in pure strategies [l], [3], [4]. 
The author has therefore, used these optimal control problems to study many aspects of such 
corresponding differential games (two-sided variational problems): the effect of different boundary 
conditions, devising solution procedures, study of singular behavior, differences in the structure of 
optimal allocation policies for various model forms. Most solution aspects of the one-sided problem are 
present in the two-sided one. (There are exceptions, however (see [26).) In solving [26] the supporting 
weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [31], the author made use of his knowledge of a related optimal 
control problem [24]. 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF MODELS 
It seems appropriate to briefly discuss the general implications of the models examined in this 
(1) optimal tactical allocation, 
(2) intelligence, 
(3) command and control systems, 
(4) human decision making. 
The discussion of these areas is not mutually exclusive. 
Of interest to the military tactician is whether optimal fire distribution rules evolve dynamically 
during the course of battle. Are target priorities static or do they evolve dynamically with the course 
of battle? With respect to optimal control models, this may be mathematically stated as whether there 
are transition (switching) surfaces in the solution. It has been seen in the idealized and simplified models 
studied here that target priorities do change. This is related to the evolution of marginal return of 
target destruction (value of dual variable). It has been seen that this evolution depends on the goals 
of the combatants (utility assigned to surviving force types at the end of the battle) and also the condi- 
tions which terminate the battle. In the terminal control problem studied here, a shift in target priorities 
is present only in a losing case, whereas in a fixed duration battle such a switch is sometimes inde- 
pendent of winning or losing and then depends only on weapon system capabilities and the prescribed 
duration of battle. 
Schreiber [20] has proposed an idealized and simple, but yet illuminating, way of quantitatively 
showing the value of intelligence and command control capabilities. He introduces the concept of 
“command efficiency,’’ which is measured by the fraction of the enemy’s destroyed units from which 
fire has been redirected. The effect of poor intelligence and poor capabilities for redirecting fire from 
paper to the following areas: 
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destroyed targets is to produce “overkill.” Schreiber’s equations for combat involved this fraction called 
command efficiency,” and they reduce to Lanchester-type equations for area fire when the fraction 
is 0 and aimed fire for a value of 1. It has been seen that the optimal tactics are quite different for these 
two cases. When intelligence and command control systems are very efficient, the optimal tactic is 
seen always to be concentration of fire on a specific target type. When capability for redirection of 
fire from destroyed targets is poor (either through damage assessment or constraints on new target 
acquisition), the optimal tactic may be to allocate fire in a proportional fashion over target types in a 
way that holds the ratios of target density in each target area to be constant. Thus, these models indicate 
that the optimal tactics of fire distribution vary with command and control capabilities. 
These models also show the importance of intelligence in devising the “best” tactics in combat. 
Intelligence on enemy weapon system capabilities (kill rates including target acquisition rates) and 
potential length of engagement play a central part. It has also been seen that for fights-to-the-finish and 
linear-law attrition cases intelligence on enemy force levels is also required. For artillery fire support 
missions against various troop concentrations, knowledge of troop densities is essential in the assign- 
ment of target priorities. Particularly dense concentrations where the initial kill potential is high are 
seen to be cases where the optimal tactic is to concentrate fire on one target for awhile. 
These models may be interpreted to show the value of human judgment in combat. They indicate, 
as does common sense and experience, that in battle a commander must use his judgment to ascertain 
to what end can the course of battle be steered so that he may devise his strategy accordingly. The 
demonstrated sensitivity of these models to many factors shows the importance of human assessment of 
a situation and the importance of good judgment in assigning utility to forces surviving the battle at 
hand. 
6. SUMMARY 
L L  
The results of this paper may be summarized as follows: 
(1) a sequence of one-sided models has been presented which shows that the tactics of fire 
distribution are sensitive to force levels, target acquisition process, the type of attrition 
process, and the termination conditions of combat, 
(2) tactics for target selection are heavily dependent upon “command efficiency,” 
(3) concentration of fire always on one target type among many occurs as an optimal tactic 
(4) target priorities do not change over time when one assigns a worth to surviving target types 
only when target acquisition is not subject to diminishing returns, 
in direct proportion to their kill rate against you. 
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